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Introduction
In this paper we study what determines the supplied working hours of employed medical doctors. In particular, we investigate the choice between working in public and private institutions, and between full time and part time contracts. As economists, we tend to think that wages and taxes are among the most relevant determinants of (physicians') labor supply. But many other relevant features are also important. Some have to do with contracts characteristics, with sectors, with hours. Some have to do with job satisfaction and motivation. In this paper, we model physicians' labor supply choices taking into account also non-pecuniary characteristics of different job types. Based on this type of model we investigate how changes in wages and taxation affect both the overall labor supply and the choice of job-type.
We estimate a structural labor supply model that allows for choices between types of jobs. The physicians are assumed to maximize utility given their budget constraints and given the availability of different types of jobs. The jobs differ with respect to the working loads. At each point in time physicians can choose between 10 different states which are a combination of working full time or part time, working in hospitals or primary care, working in the public or private sector and not working. Our model extends the basic multinomial logit model applied to panel data 1 and it is based on an econometric model developed by Dagsvik (2002) . In our model, the current choice depends on all the utility functions associated with each alternative in the past, not only the optimal ones. Thus, we allow for the random parts of the utility functions to be correlated across time and types of jobs, which implies that taste or habit persistence is included in an otherwise multinomial logit model estimated on panel data. This behavioral assumption implies that individuals' past options (and not only past optimal choices, which would have introduced state dependence in the model) matter for current choices. The model is estimated on transitions between jobs based on a panel of 6564 married employed Norwegian physicians 1 See for instance Train (2003) or Cameron and Trivedi (2005) .
0167-6296/$ -see front matter © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10. 1016/j.jhealeco.2012.12.002 from 1997 to 1999. In our data we do not observe self-employed physicians. 2 Our paper differs from earlier literature on physicians' labor supply because it is the first time that a labor supply model is estimated taking into account choices among job types and habit persistence over time. Baltagi et al. (2005) estimates a labor supply of 1303 male physicians employed only in Norwegian hospitals who worked for the whole period 1993-1997 and they obtain labor supply elasticities around 0.3. Our paper differs from theirs in many respects. The most relevant difference is that we assume that doctors can choose between different job types with predetermined number of hours, offered by the management in hospital and primary care. There are thus institutional constraints on hours worked that we have to consider when calculating the responses to economic incentives.
Saether (2005) (physicians) and Di Tommaso et al. (2009) (nurses) utilize a model that is similar to ours but it is a static model estimated on data from one year. Saether finds that a wage increase causes a modest response in total hours and a reallocation of hours in favor of the sector with increased wages. Midtunn (2007) analyzes the Norwegian physicians' choice to work only in the private sector. Gjerberg (2001) studies physicians' choice of specialty among female and male Norwegian physicians. Godager and Iversen (2009) concentrate their analysis on choices of working hours of 435 Norwegian General Practitioners after the reform of 2001 where GP's became self-employed. Also Grytten et al. (2008) study a particular aspect of the wage structure of Norwegian GP's: the effect of General Practitioners fees' changes on their income.
Labor supply of medical doctors has been studied also in other countries but none of the previous studies is similar to ours: Rizzo and Blumental (1994) analyzes only self-employed physicians. Showalter and Thurston (1997) find elasticities for self-employed US physicians equal to 0.33 while the effect is small and insignificant for employed physicians. Their paper utilizes a labor supply model that is similar to the one of Baltagi et al. (2005) . Ikenwilo and Scott (2007) estimates a labor supply model where they include job satisfaction. They use data from a Scottish survey of physicians. The uncompensated earnings elasticities vary between 0.09 (without job's quality controls) and 0.12 when they control for job's quality. Elasticities are lower for physicians working full time and they find the usual gender difference in the elasticities.
Our results imply that overall wage increases and tax reductions give the medical doctors an incentive to move to full time jobs, in particular in the private sector, at the expense of working in other jobs in the health care sector of economy. Because we allow other attributes than observed economic incentives to matter in explaining behavior, captured by random parts in the preference structure, and because availability of jobs and restrictions on hours work vary across jobs, the overall impact of changes in economic incentives on labor supply among employed Norwegian medical doctors is rather modest. Our estimates of labor supply elasticities are in line with the results for employed doctors reported in Showalter and Thurston (1997) and Ikenwilo and Scott (2007) . It should be noted that the impact of a wage increase on labor supply is in part absorbed by taxation. Because all details of a step-wise linear progressive tax system is accounted for in our model, this absorption is explicitly accounted for.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is presented. Section 3 describes the data. Estimates are given in Section 4. Elasticities and the impact of changes in taxation are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The model

The random utility labor supply model
We will assume that physicians make a choice of where to work according to what maximizes his or her utility. In what follows, we will estimate this behavior on panel data and we thus need a model that accounts for transition between states. The model we employ allows for habit persistence and therefore correlation in utilities across time. Our econometric model builds on the econometric framework developed in Dagsvik (2002) . Let U jn (t) be the utility of physician n when working in job type j at time t. The utility function is assumed to be random because there are job attributes that affect preferences that we do not observe. Let v jn (t) be the systematic part of the utility function and let ε jn (t) be the random taste shifter, assumed to be independent and identical extreme value distributed. Following Dagsvik (2002) , we assume that
The coefficient is a preference discount factor. If = 0 there is a complete strong taste or habit persistence, and if = ∞ there is no taste persistence at all and U jn (t) = jn (t) + ε jn (t). The inclusion of taste or habit persistence is a behavioral assumption and it implies that individuals' past options (and not only past optimal choices) matter for current choices. This implies that the current choice depends on all the utility functions associated with each alternative in the past, not only the optimal one.
Eq.
(1) means that the utility of choosing alternative j at time t is the highest of the two in the bracket. The first entry is the optimal utility lagged one year and where captures habit persistence. Obviously, if is infinitely large then U jn (t) = max j [ jn (t) + ε jn (t)]. In this case choices at each point in time will be related to a current random utility function. If is not very large, habit persistence plays a role in explaining behavior.
As demonstrated by Resnick and Roy (1990) , see also Dagsvik (2002) , we get a particular autocorrelation function of the utility process in (1):
We observe that if covariates are constant over time the autocorrelation from t to t − 1 is approximately equal to e − . If = ∞, there is no correlation and the model degenerates to a standard multinomial logit model that can be estimated on panel data, see Train (2003) . If = 0, then utilities are perfectly correlated across time. The motivation for applying this particular utility process is that we believe that habit persistence may play an important role in the behavior of individuals, also in the labor market.
As shown in Dagsvik (2002) the model can be employed to yield transition probabilities, which here will be estimated on panel data. We will assume that doctor n will choose the state that maximizes utility, given his or her choice set. Physicians can choose between 10 states, which vary with respect to type of institution (hospitals versus primary care), sector (public versus private) and hours offered by the institutions in the health care sector (part time versus full time). Part time is defined as a number of hours of work less than 30. We will assume that the choice set is the same for all physicians. The choice set is related to availability of jobs, characterized by offered hours. Thus, in our model the physicians are not free to choose any hours they like to work. We will assume that
Note that the g(·) function captures the rationing of full time jobs and d j are parameters to be estimated for each sector j. The g(·) function capture the availability of full time hours in the different jobs. 3 In the estimation, the sum of d j has an upper bound which ensures that 0 ≤ d j < 1 for all j.
Let Q ijnt denotes the probability that doctor n moves from state i in period t − 1 to state j in period t, and Q iint denotes the probability that doctor n stays in state i also in period t.
With the assumed probability distribution for ε jnt , we get (Dagsvik, 2002) :
V knr ]} ; ∀i, j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 9
where
The different job types that the employed doctor can choose between are: 0 = not working 1 = working part time in a hospital in the private sector; 2 = working full time in a hospital in the private sector; 3 = working part time in primary care in the private sector; 4 = working full time in primary care in the private sector; 5 = working part time in a hospital in the public sector; 6 = working full time in a hospital in the public sector; 7 = working part time in primary care in the public sector; 8 = working full time in primary care in the public sector; and 9 = working in other sectors. 4 The states, 1-9, give all possible type of jobs that employed physicians can choose between, and hence should be part of a labor supply model that attempts at studying labor supply among the stock of employed physicians.
The deterministic part of the utility function
We will assume that the systematic or deterministic part of the utility function is given by:
where C jnt is disposable annual income, and it is given by
where w jnt is the hourly wage rate, h jnt denotes annual hours of work, SI nt is the wage income from secondary jobs and I nt is nonlabor income, including the after-tax income of a spouse, child benefits and other benefits. The functional form of f t (.) depends on the characteristics of the tax function, T t (·), which is a stepwise linear tax function at time t, see Tables B.1-B.4 in Appendix B.
Thus, in our model the economic incentives agents are facing when choosing among states in the labor market is accounted for in great detail. Annual leisure is denoted L jnt . We assume 12 h a day for rest and sleep and 48 weeks of work a year. Therefore, leisure in this definition is equal to the total number of hours in a year (8760) minus sleeping time in a year minus hours of work. Leisure includes therefore hours in the week-ends and in vacation time:
Moreover, X 1nt is age and X 2nt is age squared. We account for the possibility that there is an impact on hours supplied when spouses are working in jobs where which shift work is very common like in the health sector. We have thus included a dummy variable X 3nt which equals 1 if the medical doctor is married to a person in the health sector, and equal 0 otherwise. Other observed covariates that are included to account for observed heterogeneity are the dummy variables X 4nt that equals 1 if more than one job, and equal to 0 otherwise, X 5nt equals 1 if working in turnus, 5 and equal to 0 otherwise; X 6nt equals 1 if number of children ≤6; and X 7nt equals 1 if number of children {>6, ≤11} and finally X 8nt equals 1 if female, and equal to 0 otherwise.
To account for the possibility that habit persistence may increase with age (a lower preference discount parameter) we let the preference discount parameter depend on the age and age squared of the doctor:
The wage equations
In order to estimate the model we need estimates of the wage equations. Log wage is assumed to depend on observed covariates (the Z-vector to be defined below) and a random term. The random term consists of two parts; one that is distributed across job types, individuals and time, and one that is distributed only across individuals. The latter random component accounts for correlation in wages across type of jobs at each point in time. The wage equations are the following:
where L(0,1) is the standard logistic distribution. We then get log W int = Z ntˇit + it e int + Ä it n ; i = 1, 2, . . . , 9,
The correlations in wages across jobs are given by:
The wage equations are estimated separately, but we account for selection in the following way. We estimate a set of coefficients for every year. Hence we are using 3 (1997-1999) cross-section datasets to estimate the coefficients. In the estimation of the wage equation we use a larger data set. Unmarried doctors are included and the justification is that there are no reasons to expect wages to differ with respect to marital status. The coefficients vary across the 9 job types and over time. The vector of the explanatory variables Z nt is (1, age, gender, centrality index, 6 education).
Let ϕ be the density for the normalized (0,1) logistic density distribution. And let
The latter logL t is used to estimate coefficients in the wage equations. Here s is a random draw for each individual from a standard logistic distribution, number of draws are S = 20. P jnt is a standard multinomial logit probability (for doctor n, working in job type j at time t) used to capture selection effects, see Strøm and Wagenhals (1991) for an outline of selection effects in wage equations with logistic distributed error terms.
where the vector y nt is (1, age, education, number of children above and below 6 years of age, dummy for married or cohabiting, dummy for married to a person working in the health sector or not, spouse income). Note that the coefficients, both in the wage equations and in the probabilities capturing selection effects, P jnt , vary across alternatives and over time. Not working is among the alternatives in the probabilities. The estimates of the wage equations and the probabilities related to selection effects, as well as summary statistics, are given in Appendix C.
The estimation procedure
To proceed with the estimation of the utility function we first have to calculate the disposable income function, here called consumption, in each of the 10 states. For all states, irrespective of the fact that we have observed the wage in the job chosen by the agent, 6 See Table C.2 for descriptive statistics of these variables.
we use the wage equation, including all terms, also the error terms. For the working states we have done the following:
The consumption that we will use in the estimation of the utility function is:
where the coefficients in the wage equations are estimated from the previous step. s = 1, 2, S and r = 1, 2, R are draws from the standard logistic distribution. We have used S = R = 20. Instead of integrating out the error terms in the wage equations in the disposable income function, we could have integrated them out in the final likelihood function. Due to the complexity of the model we have chosen to do the former. Due to the random variables in the wage equations which are present in the transition probabilities, the assumption of IIA is avoided. The parameters of the utility function, including the habit persistence parameter , are estimated in a maximum likelihood approach where the likelihood depends on the transition probabilities. The initial year, t 0 , is 1997, and the years where transitions can take place are 1998 and 1999. Let the vector of coefficients of to be estimated be .
Suppressing the observed variables and the random variables that are integrated out, the transition probabilities can be written
The likelihood for our sample is:
The coefficients are estimated by maximizing the likelihood function. Notice that for each individual there are only two probabilities present in the likelihood, namely those related to the transitions chosen.
Data
The data used in this study are the result of merging register data from Statistics Norway with data on physicians collected by The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (from the PAI 7 register). The register data from Statistics Norway consists of demographic, educational, income and labor market data. The income data is taken from tax returns, while the labor market data consist of employee data merged with data on employers.
The resulting panel data set covers all employed physicians in Norway in the period 1996-2000. We consider an individual as a doctor either if the person's educational attainment is as a doctor or if the person works as a doctor. In this way we include persons who might have education abroad (in which cases the registered educational attainment might not be as a doctor). In the year 2000 there were 12,376 employed physicians in Norway. We excluded the years 1996 and 2000 from our estimation because of problems with the capital income variables in 1996 (our income variables are taken from tax returns and therefore are vulnerable to changes in definitions of taxable income) and with the distribution over sectors in 2000. 8 Observations of individuals with missing values for gender or job affiliation were dropped. To simplify our analysis we chose to estimate the model for those who were physicians throughout the period 1997-1999 and who did not change marital status during this period. Individuals who were not a doctor in this period were thereby dropped as were those who became married or divorced. Table A .1 in Appendix A gives an overview of the relationship between our original data set and the data set for which we have estimated our model: 6564 married physicians.
We coded the data so that we ended up with 10 different sectors of work (including not working) divided according to whether a doctor worked in a hospital or in general health care, whether in a public or private institution and whether it was part-time and full time. 9 Our data only included hours worked per year, so weekly hours are calculated by dividing hours worked in a year by 48 (weeks in a year minus vacation). For physicians not working in a hospital or health care, we do not differentiate between part-time and full-time work. Doctors choose between the different sectors under the assumption that in each sector they will receive a wage generated by the wage equations and work the average observed hours in the sector. Table A .2 shows the number of hours worked in the different sectors. Working hours are longer in the private sector compared to in the public sector. Table A .3 gives the distribution of married physicians by gender and across sectors. Women constitute around 27% of doctors. Most doctors work in public hospitals followed by the sector called "other", and then followed by public health care. Table A .4 provides the age distribution of married doctors in the three years considered in the analysis.
Our model is based on the assumption that we can simulate the different levels of consumption and leisure which could be achieved by each individual in each sector if they chose to work there. Our calculations are based on estimated wage equations done independently for the three years 1997-1999. These estimates are commented on in Appendix C. The resulting levels of possible consumption and leisure are reported in Table A .5. For the states which are observed chosen by an individual we use observed leisure, while for other potential, but not chosen states, we use average leisure among those observed in the state. Consumption is determined by wage income, capital income, transfer income and the income of the spouse. All income variables were deflated by the consumer price index. Leisure is expressed as a percentage of available time. Available time includes time over the week-ends and vacation time but excludes 12 h per day of sleeping and personal care time. Table A .5 shows that leisure is slightly increasing 8 The year 2000 was dropped due to problems with the data for hours worked and in the distribution across sectors. In 2000 the mean hours worked is recorded as only 20.0 h a week while it is between 28.8 and 29.8 in the years 1997-1999 (which also is consistent with other aggregate statistics). The distribution across sectors is also very different in 2000 from the other years. We take this to indicate that there is a mistake in the compilation of data for 2000 (the data have been compiled from a number of different registers). 9 The part-time category includes physicians who work less than 30 h a week.
Table 1
Estimates of the utility function and offered hours density.
Variables (1) Coefficients (2) Estimates ( The estimates of and imply that the deterministic part of the utility function is strictly concave. *** Statistically significant parameter at 1% confidence level.
over time except for physicians working full time in private and public health care. Table A .6 shows the mean of the dummy for observed working full time in a sector or not. The percentage of physicians working full time in the "other" sector has been falling, while it has been increasing in the "private hospital" and "private health care" sectors. Summary statistics for the remaining explanatory variables are given in Table A .7. We use dummy variables for whether the spouse works in the health sector, whether the doctor has a side job in addition to the main job and whether the doctor is working "turnus".
In Tables A.8 .1-A.8.4, we report the observed transitions across states. Although "stayers" are dominating there are also a considerable amount of "movers".
Estimates
In Table 1 we give the estimates of the utility function and of the density function for offered hours in full time jobs.
Marginal utility of consumption is estimated to increase with age until till the age of 44. Thus younger physicians are estimated to be willing to work more than the older ones. With a spouse working in the health sector the incentives to go for higher working loads is strengthen. For physicians who are doing their internship ("turnus") the impact is the opposite. 10 Table 2 The impact of changes in wages and taxes on the mobility of physicians in 1997-1999. 6564 Marginal utility of leisure is estimated to increase with the number of older children, which imply lesser incentives to go for high working loads. Young children has no impact and may be due to the fact that day care centers are available at the working place and/or that flexible working hours makes it easier to combine work and having small children. Gender has no impact on the marginal utility of leisure. This result could be related to the fact that our sample contains only highly educated individuals and also to the relatively egalitarian division of unpaid labor within the household in the Norwegian society.
The estimate of the discounting of utilities (the -function) implies that it decreases with age up to the age of 53. This decline with age means that the younger the doctor is, the more he or she can be willing to move between jobs. After the age of 53, the estimated discounting indicate that physicians above this age again become more mobile ( becomes higher again), which may be due to the fact that older physicians leave the more strenuous full time job in hospitals and move to lower working loads or to jobs outside hospitals.
The estimates of the density of offered hours imply that full time jobs are more available in public hospitals and public primary care relative to in the private sector. However, it should be kept in mind that a full time job in the private sector has more hours than in the public sector (see Table A .2).
Labor supply elasticities and the impact of less progressive taxes on labor supply
To calculate labor supply elasticites we use the whole model, with random preferences, densities of offered hours, random parts in wage equations, correlation of wages across job types and the step-wise linear tax function according to tax rules. These elasticities, denoted aggregate elasticities, means that we have to account for the possibility that number of physicians working in some states increases at the expense of a reduction in other states. Thus, we should expect that these aggregate elasticities are lower than the individual, job-specific labor supply elasticities. 11 We would argue that it is these aggregate elasticities that are of interest for the health authorities. The reason is that they give the impact of wage increases, or changes in taxation, on the total hours supplied by all employed physicians in the population, and where details of the economic incentives, such as wages and tax structures, are embedded in a framework where institutional constraints are 11 If we use only the deterministic part of the utility function, we find that these individual job-specific labor supply elasticities for physicians working in public and private hospitals, calculated at mean values, in 1999, are around 0.5. These individual job specific elasticities are comparable with the ones reported in Baltagi et al. (2005) , although ours are somewhat higher (0.5) than theirs (0.3).
accounted for, and where unobserved non-pecuniary factors give rise to probabilities of working hours rather than deterministic predictions of working hours. 12 To find the aggregate labor supply elasticities we have calculated (or rather simulated) the impact of an overall increase in wages in 1997-1999 on total labor supply for employed physicians. Wages are increased in all 10 states.
An important aspect of our model is that an overall wage increase, or job-specific wage increase, may move the physicians between the different job types. Given that he or she works in a hospital, an increase in labor supply may imply a move from parttime jobs to full time jobs. Or he or she can move to jobs with higher working loads outside hospitals. As mentioned above we account for the fact that there are institutional constraints on hours worked that we have to consider when calculating the responses to economic incentives. Table 2 reports the impact of changes in wages and taxes on the mobility of physicians. In column 1, we report how the mobility of physicians between states in 1999 is affected by a 1% increase in wages in 1997-1999. We find that an overall wage increase move physicians' labor supply away from the public sector to the private sector, in particular to private hospitals working full time. The weighted overall aggregate labor supply elasticity, with total hours in the ten states as weights, is rather modest, 0.04. The overall wage increase also reduces the probability of not working. The elasticity of not working with respect to an overall wage increase is about −0.3.
The overall weighted elasticity of only 0.04 shadows for higher elasticity in specific jobs. An overall one per cent wage increase in the period 1997-1999 increases the number of physicians in full time jobs in private hospitals by 0.26 percent (Table 2, col. 1). This elasticity is not directly comparable with the job-specific elasticity reported above in footnote 16 (around 0.5). There are two reasons for this. In the first place, the 0.26 elasticity is derived from a model where the random parts of the utility functions and wage equations are accounted for when the elasticity is calculated. These random parts of the utility function capture other attributes than the pure economic incentives related to working in different types of jobs in the health sector. If these random parts of preferences are ignored, after the model is estimated, one puts too much weight on economic incentives in explaining behavior. Second, it is embedded in a framework where the physicians are allowed to move between different types of jobs. An overall wage increase may move the physicians that work the shortest hours (part time) toward job types with higher working loads (full time). If one fails to take into account that a wage increase shifts physicians around, one risk to overestimate the labor supply elasticities among physicians. If only wages in the public and private hospitals are increased, the move toward jobs, in particular to private hospitals is increased at the expense of working in jobs outside hospitals and working in primary care (col. 4 in Table 2 ). The number of physicians working full time and part time in the private sector increases by respectively 0.41% and 0.22%. The equivalent increases in the public hospitals are more modest, 0.06 and 0.15, respectively. Because there are far more physicians working in the public sector, the weighted average elasticities over the four possible states in private and public hospitals (full time and part time) in 1999 is 0.08, while the weighted aggregate elasticity for the whole stock of physicians is 0.03, which is due to the fact that physicians move from jobs outside hospitals to jobs in hospitals. The job type that has the strongest reduction is part time jobs in private primary care, −0.18%. The wage increase also increases the number of employed physicians (not working goes down by −0.16%).
When using the whole sample of physicians in the calculation of elasticities heterogeneity in the population affects the result. Of course, it is of importance to account for this heterogeneity. To illustrate this we have also used the whole model to calculate or simulate the elasticity for a female doctor, aged 35, with a spouse not working in the health sector and with no children. The weighted overall aggregate labor supply elasticity, with total hours in the ten states as weights, now becomes 0.12, while for the whole population as reported above it was 0.04. Clearly, heterogeneity matters in the assessment of how wage and tax changes affect labor supply.
We have also calculated the impact on the transition between states of replacing the current progressive tax structure in the relevant years (1997) (1998) (1999) ) by a flat tax of 0.28 (see Table 2 , col. 2), which is a considerable change in marginal tax rates. 13 This tax change move physicians away from part time jobs toward full time jobs in both public and private sector, but the transition to private hospitals is by far the strongest. The number of physicians working in private hospitals increases by as much as 11.43%, mostly at the expense of physicians working part time in hospitals and primary care. The impact on total hours in the population of medical doctors is rather modest; an increase of only 0.76%. For the female doctor aged 35 mentioned above the corresponding increase is 1.90%. Clearly, heterogeneity matters in the assessment of tax rate changes on labor supply.
In 2006, the Norwegian tax structure was reformed with a rather strong cut in top marginal taxes. 14 When the tax function in 1999 13 See Appendix B for the complete tax structure in 1997-1999. 14 The highest marginal rate in 2006 is equal to 44.8%, while in 1999 it is equal to 49.3%. Note that to be taxed at the highest tax rate in 2006 (44.8%) the income in is replaced by the tax function of 2006, we find results similar to the ones we found with a flat tax of 28% (see Table 2 col. 3). The responses, however, are weaker. Medical doctors get an incentive to move to private hospital (an increase of 4.74% in full time jobs). The overall impact on supplied hours among employed physicians is only 0.43%.
In Table 3 , we report how consumption changes according to the different simulations reported above. From Table 3 , col. 1, we observe that a 1% wage increase implies a change in consumption ranging from 0.3 to 0.5% in 1999.The highest change in consumption occurs for individuals working full time in private hospitals (0.51%). The introduction of a 28% flat tax (Table 3, col. 2) raises consumption for physicians' working full time. The reason for reduction in consumption for doctors working part time is that their average tax in the observed tax regimes is less than 28%.
From Table 3 , col. 3, we observe that the less progressive tax structure of 2006 increases disposable income among medical doctors by 6-8%. Physicians working full time in private hospitals get the highest increase.
Conclusion
We have estimated a structural labor supply model that allows for choices between types of jobs. At each point in time, physicians can choose between 10 different states which are a combination of working full time or part time, working in hospitals or primary care, working in the public or private sector and not working. In our model, the current choice depends on all the utility functions associated with each alternative in the past, not only the optimal ones. Thus, we allow for the random parts of the utility functions to be correlated across time and types of jobs (taste persistence). This behavioral assumption implies that individuals' past options (and not only past optimal choices) matter for current choices. The model is estimated on a panel of 6564 married Norwegian physicians from 1997 to 1999.
Our study implies that overall wage increases and tax reductions give the medical doctors an incentive to move to full time jobs, in particular in the private sector, at the expense of working in other jobs in the health sector of the economy. Because we allow other attributes than pure economic incentives to matter in explaining behavior, captured by random parts in the preference structure, and because availability of jobs and restrictions on hours worked vary across jobs, the overall impact on labor supply among Norwegian medical doctors of changes in economic incentives is rather modest. 
Appendix B. Tax functions
In this appendix, we only show tax functions for married when the spouse has an income. The tax function for married with a spouse without income is slightly different. In the empirical application we utilize all the appropriate tax functions. 
Appendix C. Wage equations and selection effects
As mentioned earlier, estimation of our model requires data for consumption in all possible states (nine working states). To be able to compute such counterfactual incomes we estimated wage equations for all individuals for the three years 1997-1999. It is usual in such estimations to take into account sample selection problems (the Heckman procedure is the most common procedure). We take sample selection into account by including the predicted choice probabilities, Pr 1 -Pr 9 , as explanatory variables in the wage equations. These probabilities were the predictions resulting from a simple multinomial logit estimation of sector choice. We show the mean of the explanatory variables used for estimating the logit and the wage equations in Tables C.1 and C.2. The estimates are given in Tables C.3 .1 and C.3.2 and the resulting average predicted probabilities are given in Table C.4.  Table C .5 gives details on the observations used in the logit estimations and in estimating the wage equations. The logit estimations were done on all physicians in a given year, while the wage equations were estimated on all working physicians with observations of wage income. The base outcome is not working. The base category is male, unmarried physicians with a registered education of less than 20 years and no children under 19 years of age (and, since they are unmarried, no spouse working in the health sector). * Statistically significant parameter at 10% confidence interval. ** Statistically significant parameter at 5% confidence interval *** Statistically significant parameter at 1% confidence interval. The base outcome is not working. The base category is male, unmarried physicians with a registered education of less than 20 years and no children under 19 years of age (and, since they are unmarried, no spouse working in the health sector). * Statistically significant parameter at 10% confidence interval. ** Statistically significant parameter at 5% confidence interval *** Statistically significant parameter at 1% confidence interval.
The estimates of the wage equations are given in Tables C.6 .1 and C.6.2. The wage equations for all nine work sectors have been estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood, allowing for correlation between the different wages. The parameters 1 -9 are the variance parameters mentioned in the main paper, and the parameters Ä 1 -Ä 9 are the parameters allowing for correlation between sectors. As can be seen from Tables C.6.1 and C.6.2, only Ä 4 in 1997 is significant at level of 95% or better, indicating that there is not much residual correlation between the different wages after correcting for the other explanatory variables.
As expected, one finds the most significant results in the largest sector, full time work in a public hospital. In this sector, being a woman reduces wages, while wages increase with age. Table C .7 shows the mean and predicted hourly wages for physicians derived from predictions for all physicians using the estimated wage equations. As expected, the predicted wages have less variation than the observed (any type of estimation/prediction will result in a smoothing of the data). -Not possible to estimate either because of multicolinearity or lack of observations with the relevant characteristic. The base category with regard to the dummy variables is male physicians with a registered education of less than 20 years and living in an especially centralized region. * Statistically significant parameter at 10% confidence interval. ** Statistically significant parameter at 5% confidence interval. *** Statistically significant parameter at 1% confidence interval. -Not possible to estimate either because of multicolinearity or lack of observations with the relevant characteristic. The base category with regard to the dummy variables is male physicians with a registered education of less than 20 years and living in an especially centralized region. * Statistically significant parameter at 10% confidence interval. ** Statistically significant parameter at 5% confidence interval. *** Statistically significant parameter at 1% confidence interval. 
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